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How the Biological/Social Divide Limits Disability
and Equality
Martha T. McCluskey*

INTRODUCTION

What is disability? That question has been central to the struggle
for substantive justice for people with disabilities. The standard
approach focuses on sorting social function from biological status to
determine "real" disadvantage. However, this division confines and
confuses prevailing visions of equality not only for disability but also
for race, gender, and sexual orientation.
To advance disability rights, advocates have often sought to
replace a medical model of disability with a model of disability as
socially constructed. 1 That revised framework presents disability
inequality as a problem not of inherent physiological limitation but of
social disparagement analogous to race discrimination. 2 For both race
and disability, prejudice creates irrelevant biological differences as
marks of inferior identity, legitimating systematic sociolegal
penalties. Despite broad acceptance of the idea that inequality is
partly a social problem,3 most theory and law continues to assume
* Professor of Law and William J. Magavem Faculty Scholar, State University ofNew
York at Buffalo. Thanks for discussions on presentations of this Article at the Feminism and
Legal Theory Workshop at Emory University; the Association for the Study of Law, Culture
and the Humanities 2004 Annual Meeting; the University of Wisconsin Law School, the
University at Buffalo Law School, and the 1999American Bar Association Annual Meeting,
Labor and Employment Law Section. Thanks also to Laura Kessler and Kate Kaul for
comments on the manuscript.
1. For an explanation of the medical and social models of disability, and how the social
model helped shape a civil rights perspective on disability, see Mary Crossley, The Disability
Kaleidescope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 653-62 (1999).
2. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of DisabilityLaw, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2004)
(explaining the development of a disability rights movement focused on antidiscrimination).
3. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1251, 1252 (2007) (questioning how the social model has come to be seen as the
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that inequality in the context of disability also stems from real
biological disadvantages that can be eliminated only through
affirmative accommodation of difference. The persisting, central
division between social and biological causes of disability has
developed into a bind that impedes meaningful analysis and reform of
injustice.
This Article examines two separate areas marked by controversy
over the legal definition of "disability": workers' compensation and
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").4 These two areas
appear to take opposing approaches. In workers' compensation, law
reforms have emphasized a medical definition, while prominent ADA
jurisprudence has rejected a medical model in favor of social context
(until recent statutory reforms).
Despite this superficial divergence, both legal regimes converge to
reinforce the disadvantageous status of disability. The choice
between biological status or social function in disability law echoes
the choice of equal treatment versus special treatment of gender
"difference" in traditional equality doctrine long criticized by
feminist legal theorists. 5 The equal-treatment principle focuses on
ignoring irrelevant gender-based differences as the way to overcome
disadvantages linked to gender. 6 Conversely, the special-treatment
principle focuses on recognizing and responding to7 gender-based
differences as the way to overcome gender inequality.

foundation ofdisability civil rights).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 2009).
5. For a discussion of the equal versus special treatment dilemma in feminist theory, see
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-44 (1986). See also Martha T. McCluskey,
Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97
YALE L.J. 863, 870-73 (1988) (comparing feminist critiques of the equal-special treatment
division to disability discrimination law prior to the ADA).
6. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/SpecialTreatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 352-70 (1985)
(explaining the advantages of and equal treatment approach to discrimination against pregnant
women).
7. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 513, 518-22 (1983) (arguing for affirmative sex-based protection of pregnant women in
the workplace).
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This seemingly logical choice presents a double bind for gender
equality.8 Either way, women lose, as Catharine MacKinnon argued,
because whether women are treated the same as men or different
from men, this framework positions men as the standard against
which women are measured. 9 For example, a classic equal treatmentspecial treatment dilemma asked whether women workers with
family care responsibilities should be treated as equal to traditional
working men or different from those men. In response, feminists
argued that gender equality would be better advanced by asking
whether the workplace normally should be structured to assume
workers have little or no family caretaking responsibilities.l°
This problem of covert biased norms underlying the samenessdifference dilemma extends to other kinds of status hierarchies.
African American boys, for instance, or transgendered youth, or
working mothers may constitute groups whose particular gendered
interests and identities are interpreted as deviations from an unstated
and normalized gender baseline in certain contexts. By implicitly
accepting that particular needs or interests count as disadvantageous
"differences," in contrast to an assumed baseline in which a specific
characteristic is normal and normative, either a sameness or a
difference-based approach will be likely to reinforce a status-based
hierarchy.
The double bind of the equal treatment-special treatment
framework is repeated in the choice between defining disability as a
problem of biological status or a problem of social functioning. A
particular physiological condition can be treated as an essential
disadvantage precluding productive functioning or as a tangential
social contingency that can be overcome through productive
functioning. Either way, disadvantages of disability are constructed

8. See Martha T. McCluskey, SubsidizedLives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 122-26 (1999) (comparing the equal-special treatment
framework to the bad choices constructed by the efficiency-redistribution division).
9. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 221

(1989).
10. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1-3 (2000) (analyzing the problem of combining market work and

family responsibilities as the result of problematic gender ideology and institutional structures
separating a sphere of domesticity from market work).
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against assumed and often covert baselines of normal and normative
social and biological functioning that, to a large extent, legitimate the
inequality of disability.
As Martha Fineman argues in the context of gender, obsession
with the origins of difference-is it biological or social?--diverts
attention from the effects of difference." Categorizing difference
along this divide has little benefit for efforts to reduce the
disadvantages of "difference," because both biology and society can
be amenable to or resistant to change; both are subject to political and
moral interpretation.' 2 In the case of disability, as with gender, the
positivist inquiry into what the relevant difference is cannot be
separated from the normative inquiry into what the relevant
difference should be.
The focus on separating essential from contingent differencewhether of gender or disability-implicitly reinforces the idea of
"true" difference as non-ideological and non-political. Any harms (or
benefits) associated with that difference then appear natural and
normal rather than unjust. The diverging definitions of disability in
workers' compensation and ADA law exemplify how the legal focus
on sorting out social from biological, regardless of which is chosen as
"most real," begs the deeper questions about when the disadvantages
of difference should be understood as public injustice. That is, the
underlying question of inequality should not be who is really
different or whose real differences deserve special accommodation.
Instead, we must ask whose potentially disadvantageous differences
are systematically privileged as public concerns deserving public
support and whose are penalized as private problems.
Part I of this Article outlines the standard division of equality into
two scales, one formal and one substantive, and explains how a
problematic division between biological identity and social
functioning has been used to support these scales and to rank
disability, race, and gender.
Part II turns to the example of workers' compensation law reforms
to criticize what appears to be a medical approach to defining
11. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 34-35 (1995).
12. Id.at 35.
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disability. Part III examines the contrasting social approach to
disability in the ADA rulings, showing the similar flaws of this
slippery attempt to focus on social functioning separate from
biological status. The Article concludes that by rejecting a focus on
sorting biological from social cause of disability's disadvantage, we
might better advance equality.
I. EQUALITY THEORY

A. FormalEquality'sHierarchy:Race, Gender, andDisability
1. Correcting the Disadvantages of Irrelevant Difference
In the classic legal antidiscrimination paradigm, inequality is a
formal problem of distinguishing sameness from difference.13 The
traditional equality doctrine focuses on weeding out false or irrational
correlations between formal biological difference and functional
sameness. 14 That formal equality paradigm produces a hierarchy of
equality protection, whereby the difference of race gets the greatest
legal protection (strict scrutiny), 15 sex gets an intermediate level of
protection, 16 and disability a lesser level of protection (rational basis
review). 17 That ranking follows from the assumption that the apparent
physical differences of race are almost never rationally related to
functional difference, while the physical differences of gender are
sometimes relevant, and the physical differences of disability are
often relevant. In other words, formal equal protection increases as
biological difference decreases. 18
In this scheme, discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or
disability is "legitimate" if based on function rather than physical

13. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(denying heightened scrutiny for disadvantageous treatment of mental disability on the theory
that equal protection directs "that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike").
14. Id.at 478 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id.at 440.
16. Id.at 440-44.
17. Id. at 446.
18. Id. at 440-44 (distinguishing the legal treatment of the "real and undeniable"
differences of mental retardation from usually irrelevant and prejudice-based differences of race
and frequently irrelevant differences of gender).
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form, fact rather than value. The move from race to disability on this
scale marks a move from weaker to greater relationship between
merely formal appearances of difference and the functional
socioeconomic reality of different ability. Because this scale assumes
functional differences are potentially measurable facts, differentiating
on the basis of functional characteristics appears rational.
Differentiations based on pure status-apart from function-appear
irrational, because maintaining status divorced from functional
purpose is assumed to be an unreasonable and illegitimate
government purpose.
On this traditional scale, because disability differences are most
"real"-or most behavioral-differentiation based on disability appears
least likely to involve irrationality or problematic value judgments
such as hostility or subordination for its own sake.1 9 This Article's
goal is not to defend disability's place at the bottom of this hierarchy,
but rather to counter the retrenchment of disability rights (and of
equality more broadly) by returning to the earlier critical project of
challenging this hierarchy and the equality paradigm that produces it.
2. The Social Substance of Formal Biological Difference
Critical analysis of the problem of race and sex inequality has
shifted the focus from formal difference to substantive
subordination. 20 Feminist critiques of the choice between equal and
different treatment have been part of a broader effort to explore the
disparate substantive effects of facially neutral treatment.2' In a social
19. Id. at 443 (explaining that the presence ofrelevant immutable functional difference in
the context of disability and the history of legislative protection makes prejudice unlikely). For
a critique ofthis analysis, see McCluskey, supranote 5, at 868-70.
20. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassiication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 11-14 (2003) (discussing

historical support for the antisubordination interpretation); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
above All Sex, Race, and EqualProtection,61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1986) (advocating
a move from antidifferentiation to antisubordination as the framework for equality law); Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107-08 (1976)
(distinguishing between an anticlassification approach to equal protection and an
antisubordination approach).
21. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 20, at 141-46 (1976) (advocating extending equal protection
to disparate impact on the theory that the problem of inequality is systemic harm not simply
misclassification).
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historical context in which unequal treatment of a particular identity
becomes systematically and pervasively entrenched in institutions,
culture, and policies, it is logical to expect that inequality on the basis
of such an identity would come to appear natural, rational, and
neutral. 2 This means a narrow focus on formal equality will be less
effective the more severe the problem of unjust inequality.
The seemingly formal task of determining sameness and
difference always requires reference to a substantive purpose.
Whether a table is really the same as or different from a chair or a cat
depends on whether the purpose of the categorization is, for instance,
to sell furniture or to collect one person's belongings. As Martha
Minow wrote in her analysis of disability discrimination and equality,
difference always exists in the social context of relationship rather
than as either an essential status or functional fact inherent in an
individual.23 Inequality creates real difference as much as real
difference creates inequality.
Strict judicial scrutiny for explicit governmental racial
discrimination gets its logic not solely from the formal principle of
"treating likes alike," but also from substantive judgments about the
relative harm of racial classification compared to other
classifications, or about the relative harms of racial exclusion
compared to alleged harms of racial integration.24 Further, strict
scrutiny doctrine rests on substantive judgments about when
discrimination should be categorized as related to or separate from
"race" and when racial discrimination should be categorized as
caused by or separate from government action.
22. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635, 654 (1983) (discussing

how hostility toward women becomes routine rationality); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court,
1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 68 (1987) ("Power is at its
peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious
challenges from discussion or even imagination.").
23. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
AMERICAN LAW 1-4, 22 (1990).

INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,

AND

24. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 34 (1959) (identifying the substantive normative judgments inevitable to constitutional
rulings desegregating schools); Finley, supra note 5, at 1150 (explaining in the context of sex
discrimination that formal equality analysis is indeterminate without substantive judgments
about ultimate social aims).
25. For example, compare the majority opinion and dissent in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
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Similarly, turning to disability, if a person with paraplegia is
excluded from a public bus with steps, we must go beyond simple
fact and formal logic to conclude that this exclusion results from
"real difference" rather than from false stereotype. Judgments about
whether that person is "really" different from people who can climb
up bus steps depend on what we consider the substantive purpose of
the bus: transportation for the public, or transportation for members
of the public who can climb steps? Determining whether the
exclusion at issue is neutral treatment with disadvantageous effects
on those who are "different" or biased treatment based on prejudice
against persons with disabilities depends not on the physiological fact
of a particular mobility limitation, but on substantive moral and
political decisions about whether buses should normally and naturally
26
be designed for entrance via steps rather than by ramps or lifts.
Such facially neutral decisions can represent and reinforce
assumptions of unequal status and animus just as effectively as overt
expressions of hostility directed at physical difference. Feminist
critique has argued that a society in which mothers count as normally
productive workers would treat employment leave for childbirth and
childcare as normal and neutral to productive work rather than as a
special accommodation. 7 Similarly, a society that viewed wheelchair
users, stroller users, or shopping-cart pushers as important or normal
examples of the general public for whom public services should be
designed might normally and cost-effectively construct transportation
systems free of steps. 28 Disability law scholarship has similarly
analyzed how substantive accommodations can overlap with formal
neutral treatment,2 9 rendering the normative distinction between
U.S. 717, 749-52, 761-62 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing about whether racial
segregation of Detroit schools stemmed from government racial policies).
26. McCluskey, supra note 5, at 872-73.
27. Finley, supra note 5, at 1168.
28. McCluskey, supranote 5, at 873.
29.

See Christine Jolls, AntidiscriminationandAccommodation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 642,

698 (2001) (showing that the standard antidiscrimination law sometimes imposes substantive
requirements similar to the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement). See generally
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination

Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004) (analyzing the similarity between removal of social
barriers through reasonable accommodations and removal of barriers through equal treatment);
McCluskey, supranote 5, at 878-80 (arguing that disability discrimination doctrine should treat
accommodations for disabilities as a form of the disparate impact approach to
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against discrimination and substantive
formal protection
accommodation ultimately shaky.3 °
Given the inevitably substantive nature of formal equality, some
critics have argued that moving from antidiscrimination to
antisubordination would explicitly address rather than avoid the
competing substantive values necessarily at issue.3 ' Yet the effort to
advance substantive equality by identifying and remedying
substantive subordination often has ironically tightened rather than
loosened the biological versus social bind.
B. Substantive Equality'sHierarchy:Disability,Gender, andRace
1. Correcting the Disadvantages of Real and Relevant Difference
Courts sometimes have applied formal equality doctrine with a
vigorously critical eye toward uncovering the substantive judgments
underlying claims of functional and natural differences. 32 However,
instead of pushing the boundaries of formal equality further toward
open and careful analysis of its entanglement with substantive results,
substantive equality has largely gained ground as a separate approach
focused on alleviating the harmful disadvantages of "real" difference.
By largely reinscribing rather than resisting the dichotomy between
formal equal treatment and substantive accommodation of individual
difference, this expanded substantive equality framework helps
narrow both formal equality and substantive equality.
The ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement is a
paradigmatic example of an explicitly substantive approach to
equality. In the mainstream view, this accommodation requirement is
largely distinct from and opposed to antidiscrimination principles,
antidiscrimination);

Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA

Accommodations asAntidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004).

30. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the
Politicsof(Disability)CivilRights, 89 VA. L. REv. 825, 830-31 (2003).
3 1. See Colker, supranote 20; Fiss, supranote 20.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) (scrutinizing sexbased exclusion from a state educational institution for overgeneralization, ties to historically
suspect gender ideology, post-hoc rationalization, and closeness of fit between means and
ends).
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tracking the special versus equal treatment divide.33 Conventional
wisdom holds that accommodation involves different treatment, in
while
relevant
differences,
response
to
functionally
antidiscrimination involves similar treatment, reflecting "blindness"
to difference.
In the conventional model of substantive equality, legal protection
increases with increased biological difference, reversing the hierarchy
of formal equality. Disability is typically ranked as the most
deserving of substantive protection; gender is in the middle, and race
is the least deserving of substantive protection.3 4 In the standard
view, the differences of disability commonly involve "real" limits on
substantive social functioning, making accommodation, rather than
antidiscrimination, the more appropriate approach to addressing
disadvantages of disability. Similarly, because the differences of
gender are conventionally assumed to involve a mixture of "real"
functional differences and "false" social stereotypes, gender equality
can logically require a mixture of accommodation and
antidiscrimination protections. Finally, the standard view holds that
affirmative accommodation of racial difference is almost never
appropriate, because this view assumes the differences of race are
almost never a matter of "real" functional limits.
Following this substantive hierarchy, the ADA focuses centrally
on accommodation as the leading legal strategy for promoting
equality in the context of disability. For gender equality,
requirements for substantive accommodation such as the Family and
Medical Leave Act 35 have gained a place alongside traditional civil
rights laws as a means to alleviating functional differences related to
gender. In the context of racial equality, however, recent doctrine has
sharply limited explicit (and perhaps implicit) accommodation of
33. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin A. Nelson, Discriminationwith a Difference: Can
Employment DiscriminationLaw Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C.
L. REv. 307, 311 (2001) (grounding analysis of ADA in an assumption that its reasonable
accommodation requirement is in tension with antidiscrimination principles).
34. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41,446 (1985).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2006) (requiring employers to provide up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave for certain family and medical reasons).
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race-based differences to achieve substantive outcomes, even in the
face of morally or politically compelling substantive purposes. 36
2. The Biological Form of Substantive Dominance
Critics of substantive approaches to equality argue that claims of
beneficial response to "real" difference have long rationalized some37
of the worst injustices in the context of race, gender, and disability.
Distinguishing benign from malign accommodation of difference is
just as subject to contested and covert substantive judgments as
distinguishing between "real" and "false" difference. If one assumes
a history and context of systemic, normalized prejudice and
institutionalized subordination, laws claiming to correct substantive
dominance actually may serve to entrench that dominance
(intentionally or accidentally).
This separate and reversed scale of substantive equality addresses
the dilemma of substantive dominance by returning to the same
formalistic division between biological and sociological difference
that masks the substantive bias it is supposed to solve. In the standard
analysis, benign and malign recognition of difference is least likely to
be confused in the case of disability, somewhat more likely in the
case of gender, and most likely in the case of race. As this framework
presumes the disadvantages of disability represent "real" functional
limitations rather than systematic hostility, accommodations to
compensate or mitigate these disadvantages will seem less likely to
create harmful stigmas or constructions of difference. In contrast, this
framework assumes that accommodations aimed at compensating or
mitigating disadvantages associated with race (or at reconstructing
alleged "disadvantages" into productive "diversity") will be more
likely to produce than to prevent harmful differentiation. Because this
standard view assumes racial disadvantages primarily result from
socially stigmatizing and stereotyping racial differences, any social
36. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (ruling that voluntary school integration plans violated equal protection).
37. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Ic. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to all race classifications regardless of purpose, because "it may not
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign" (citations omitted)). See generally
Wendy W. Williams, Notesfrom a FirstGeneration, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 99 (1989).
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"intervention" to alleviate (or celebrate) racial difference is likely to
further reinforce those social perceptions of functional inferiority.
Disability's position at the top of the substantive equality
hierarchy has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of stronger and
more substantive support for disability equality than for race or
gender equality. That conclusion assumes too simplistically that the
scale values rather than shortchanges equality. 38 By linking the most
substantive equality with the identity most identified with individual
biological status, the substantive scale targets the most substantive
protection to the seemingly most privatized and naturalized
constraints. The scale identifies unequal status primarily with
constrained autonomy and then further identifies individual biology
as the clearest substantive constraint on that autonomy. This
emphasis on individual biology therefore appears to make equality a
question of separating dependent victims in need of support from
independent rational actors capable of free choice.39
Framed this way, the substantive equality scale elevates disability
by reaffirming its subordinated status as an identity of "real"
victimhood, dependence, and incapacity for rational action. Those
who really deserve substantive intervention to alleviate disadvantage
are those whose own choices have not produced that disadvantage. If
those victims or dependents are deemed really incapable of
successful functioning (in market, state, or family), however, then the
substantive intervention they deserve is, by definition, a deviation
from normally rational processes. By presenting substantive
accommodations as a way of compensating for "real" and rational
functional constraints (dependency), this scale defines those
accommodations as presumptively and essentially irrational (i.e.,
costly and constraining) for society as a whole. For example, in a
leading analysis of the meaning of substantive equality under the
ADA, Christine Jolls defines "accommodation" as a requirement that

38. See, e.g., Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 135 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
39. For a nuanced and insightful analysis of how a feminist focus on substantive
"dominance" became interpreted to equate feminism with women's victimization, see Kathryn
Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103
YALE L.J. 1533, 1552-57 (1994) (reviewing KATIE RoipHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR
AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)).
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employers (or others) "incur special costs in response to the
distinctive needs (as measured against existing market structures) of
particular, identifiable demographic groups" in circumstances
without intentional animus based on irrelevant group membership.4 °
The view of substantive equality as costly support for distinctively
needy dependents casts the question of substantive accommodations
as a policy choice to favor "redistribution" over "efficiency" within
the prevailing economic paradigm. 41 That paradigm defines
"efficiency" as the functioning of the "free market" presumed to
normally and naturally produce maximum societal well-being.42 In
this view, formal antidiscrimination law can be compatible with
"efficiency" to the extent it eliminates "irrational" actions with no
relevance to social function. In contrast, this prevailing economic
paradigm defines substantive accommodations in response to
socioeconomic functioning as the "redistribution" of societal
resources away from overall socioeconomic well-being in order to
benefit a subset of society: those who are disadvantaged.
This definitional framework leads to the tautological conclusion
that substantive accommodations-like those in the ADA-must be
sharply limited to advance equality as well as other public interests,
such as economic productivity. If accommodations are defined as
costly to overall societal well-being, then, by definition,
accommodations risk increasing rather than redressing inequality.
Following this circular logic, as the costs of accommodation drain
other benefits to public welfare, fewer societal resources will be
available to support costly accommodations. As a result, the
supposed beneficiaries of substantive accommodations will
eventually be worse off (along with society in general). Like the
concept of "special treatment" critiqued in feminist theory, the
concept of "redistribution" is a way of defining substantive social
change as normatively harmful based on abnormal individual
40. Jolls, supranote 29, at 648.
41. See, e.g., Issacharoff& Nelson, supranote 33, at 310-11 (explaining the ADA rulings
narrowing the definition of disability as the result of the ADA's heightened focus on
redistribution, in tension with antidiscrimination).
42. For a critique of the concept of "efficiency" distinct from "redistribution," see Martha
T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform, " 50 RUTGERS L.
REv. 657, 716-67 (1998).
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"difference" or "disadvantage," and only grudgingly available as a
limited last resort for individuals or groups who cannot help their
substandard functioning.43 Indeed, Samuel Bagenstos has analyzed
how reducing "redistributive" welfare payments to people with
disabilities was one of the purposes emphasized by proponents of the
ADA, and he shows how this anti-dependency purpose sets up an
inherent tension
that sharply limits the law's protection even as it
44
it.
justifies
In short, disability's position at the top of this substantive scale
means the limitations of disability are presumptively burdensome and
deserving of correction only if not "undue." 45 Although this scale
decrees that some accommodation is "due" to help overcome the real
burdens of disability, it also sets up a double bind where the most
deserving accommodations can appear the most costly. Substantive
accommodations appear to be "due" particularly to those whose
functional incapacity appears so severe as to demand unduly undoing
those functions of society deemed essentially normal and beneficial.46
This bind means that, although the ADA sometimes can bring vital
gains in substantive equality in practice, its potential for redressing
the disadvantages of disability has also been sharply constrained and
vigorously contested. In short, the ADA's substantive equality
requirements represent not so much a clear victory for disability
rights, but instead reflect a continuing confusion and contest over
whether equal rights or unequal charity is the best answer to
disability's disadvantage.
This substantive equality scale, like the formal equality scale it
supplements, obscures our ability to see how substantive inequality is
43. See McCluskey, supranote 8, at 121-28.
44. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct as Welfare Reform, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 956-57, 1023-26 (2003).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (providing "undue hardship on the operation of the
business" as a defense exempting employers from the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement); see also id. § 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense").
46. For a critical analysis of judicial reasoning portraying accommodations for less
severely disabled employees as unjustified "handouts," see Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability,"'86 VA. L. REv. 397, 470 & n.277 (2000); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 48 &

n.170 (2000).
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not simply a problem of inherently costly individual limitations,
constraining differences, or external domination precluding
individual choice. Instead, substantive inequality can be a problem of
social and political decisions to privilege some individual constraints
or choices while penalizing others. Critiques of the equal treatmentspecial treatment dilemma explain that if a group's particular
limitations, needs, or interests are recognized, supported, and valued
as part of normally beneficial functioning, a person in that group can
appear formally equal and substantively different at the same time.47
Similarly, if a group's particular (biological or social) limitations,
needs, or interests are recognized as normative baselines or natural
aspects of human functioning, a person identified with that group can
appear both to deserve substantive support and to be an autonomous
rational actor enhancing overall public well-being.4 8
Is the human need for sleep, for example, a costly limitation or
status of dependency in need of substantive accommodation in work
hours for those particularly unable or unwilling to take sufficient
drugs to maintain close to twenty-four-hour wakefulness? Similarly,
are demands for workplace toilets requests for special treatment by
those unwilling or unable to use catheters or diapers to eliminate
bodily waste at work? 49 It misses the mark to ask whether workers'
needs for daily sleep or for toilets count as biological or social
constraints in need of costly accommodation, on the one hand, or
freely chosen social "differences," on the other. Instead, a more
meaningful question would ask about the substantive merits of
requiring workplaces to support daily sleep and toilet use. In the
contemporary U.S., status or conduct as a daily sleeper or as a toilet
user is not typically perceived as disadvantageous dependence or
difference precisely because both the social choices and the
47. McCluskey, supranote 8, at 128-29.
48. For an extended discussion of disability discrimination as a problem of social
prejudice based on problematic construction of normal human functioning, see Bagenstos,
supranote 46, at 436-50; see also McCluskey, supranote 5, at 872-73 (arguing that equality
doctrine should be based on the idea that "disability is normal").
49. See generally MARC LINDER & INGRID NYGAARD, VOID WHERE PROHIBITED: REST
BREAKS AND THE RIGHT TO URINATE ON COMPANY TIME (1998) (discussing changing policies

toward restroom breaks in the workplace).
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biological constraints involved generally are deemed normal and
beneficial despite any associated costs.
Similarly, Laura Kessler astutely explains how the biological
versus social construction question wrongly reduces substantive
inequality to a question of individual constraint versus choice in
employment discrimination cases involving workers' family
caretaking. 50 For example, a court denied the sex discrimination
claim of a breast-feeding worker who was demoted and harassed for
taking work breaks (with her employer's approval) to pump her
breasts, reasoning that any disadvantage was the result of real and
relevant female physiological difference, rather than gender
stereotypes. 5' Despite criticizing this biological determinism, Kessler
analyzes how a shift to social constructivism also tends to legitimate
workplace penalties for family caretakers.52 If caretaking women are
seen as disadvantaged at work by culture, rather than by biology, then
this harm appears to be the product of changeable individual
behavior, rather than fixed gender identity. 53 Because breast-feeding
workers can always "choose" not to breast-feed to avoid employment
penalties, any resulting workplace detriments may be attributed to
individual choice rather then to sex discrimination. But if we counter
such conclusions by stressing constraints on women's capacity for
meaningful choice, we risk reinforcing policies promoting control
and exclusion more than accommodation and support.5 4 Kessler
concludes that neither social nor biological approaches challenge the
problematic presumption that family caretaking represents social or
biological inferiority.5 5 She advocates grounding substantive
accommodation not in private incapacity but instead in public
50. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women's Cultural Caregiving,and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371,447,452-53 (2001).
51. Id. at 405-06 (discussing Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)). The court in Martinez also denied the plaintiff's claim that disadvantageous treatment
based on breast-feeding constituted disability discrimination under the ADA, reasoning that
breast-feeding, while biological, is not a physiological disorder. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at
308-09.
52. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 405-07.
53. Id. at 443.
54. Id. at 448-49.
55. Id. at 437.
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capacity for advancing social and moral well-being.5 6 Just as equality
is not a question of who is "different" but of whose differences are
normally privileged, equality is not simply a question of who can
freely choose but of whose "choices" are normally privileged.
C. Tipping The EqualityScales: Sexual Orientation
Adding sexual orientation destabilizes both equality scales by
foregrounding the limits of the biological/social inquiry into false
difference or real constraint on choice. Formal protection against
irrational attributions of "difference" on the basis of status as gay or
lesbian will seem difficult to distinguish from claims for substantive
accommodation of difference on the basis of gay or lesbian conduct.
Even if sexual orientation is viewed as an irrelevant immutable
biological status subject to false attributions of difference,57 like race,
sex, and disability (in the problematic mainstream view), this
different status involves changeable social conduct by those
challenging their subordinate status. The potentially irrelevant
difference of sexual orientation is generally understood as socially
invisible without some action by the individual marked as different
(such as coming out as "gay" or having a same-sex intimate
relationship).
This confusion of identity and action grounds arguments that laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation confer
"special rights" (substantive accommodation of different functioning)
rather than "equal rights" (formal protection for sameness). 58 As with
disability or gender, this supposed "accommodation" can appear
unjustified because the "different" functioning of sexual orientation
appears to involve contested individual, cultural, and moral choices
rather than simply biological constraint.
56. Id. at 452-53.
57.

See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientationand the Politics ofBiology: A Critiqueofthe

Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994) (critiquing arguments relying on
biological immutability as the basis for constitutional equal protection of lesbians and gay
men).
58. See Peter J. Rubin, EqualRights, Special Rights andthe Nature of Antidiscrimination
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 588-89 (1998); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637-38 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
can lead to special rights for "homosexual conduct").
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Focusing on sexual orientation as a window into broader problems
with equality law, Kenji Yoshino argues for expanding the vision of
equality to protect against imposed sameness, not just forced
difference. 59 Yoshino describes the heavy costs of "covering" gay
identity to show that problematic social ascription of sameness as
well as imposed difference lies at the heart of status inequality.6 °
Explaining a continuum of unjust constraints on the choice to be or
act "different," Yoshino argues that meaningful equality requires
going beyond protecting a gay man as long as he "converts" to
heterosexuality, "passes" as straight (as in the military's don't ask,
"covers" his identity as gay (coming
don't tell policy), or sufficiently
61
out without "flaunting it").
The conventional equality paradigm always confers protection for
changeable conduct, even though on the surface it limits protection to
essential status (whether status as "really" the same under formal
equality, or status as "really" different under substantive equality). As
Yoshino concludes, in the context of race and gender as well as
sexual orientation, civil rights laws are fundamentally about who
should change their attitudes and behavior (or the identity those
actions constitute): the white supremacist or the person of color? The
woman or the misogynist? The lesbian or the homophobe? 62 As the
Supreme Court infamously concluded in dismissing segregation's
harm as a problem of bad attitudes on the part of those categorized as
black in Plessy v. Ferguson, racial segregation involves both an
imposition of formal biological status and also a social act
interpreting this status as harmful.63 The Court's reasoning was
59. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS 74-110 (2006).
60. Id.at 107.
61. Id. at 18-19.
62. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 938 (2002). Critical race scholar Angela
Harris similarly discusses how a contemporary shift from categorical racism (based on ancestral
identity) to colorism (based on a complex hierarchy of racial appearance) might heighten racial
stigma for those who do not or cannot avoid certain racially-coded appearances or behaviors.
Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?:Racism and Colorism in the New Century,
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 52, 64 (2008).

63. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (infamously reasoning that if laws
mandating racial segregation are perceived as a badge of inferiority, that "is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it").
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flawed not because segregation's harm is purely biological, but
because the Court affirmed the wrong social interpretation of
segregation.
Disability discrimination's position at the top of the substantive
scale highlights this question of who should change by explicitly
identifying equality with limited accommodation. Yet that
substantive question is inevitable to the formal antidiscrimination
scale.64 Both formal and substantive equality scales limit analysis of
the question who should change by using a simplistic division
between a fixed biological core and contingent social response. By
imagining an unchangeable biological core without relevant
substance, the formal equal treatment principle makes its prohibition
of unequal treatment appear to be free from (rational and relevant)
substantive cost or controversy. On the other hand, by imagining a
biological status that is unchangeable but relevant to beneficial
substantive functioning, the substantive accommodation principle
presents its requirement of "different" treatment as generally costly
and therefore normally sharply limited.
As Kessler and Yoshino show, reducing inequality to biological
constraints on individual action legitimates inequality on both formal
and substantive scales because-on closer examination-every
instance of protected biological constraint can logically appear to
involve unprotected social choice. 65 The social constructivist
alternative is simply the other side of this problem. The formal
equality scale justifies change to the extent harm results from
immaterial social ideas, and the substantive equality scale justifies
change to the extent social interpretation is immaterial to the harm.
Equality will logically appear suspect when founded on social
immateriality, however, because in the real world, judgments of harm
involve social ideas about what matters and how.
In short, the biological/social divide provides an uneasy
justification for change that advances equality, rendering any such
change logically suspicious, because the objective line it attempts to
draw is too thin and slippery to provide satisfactory support for
change. This tension is especially clear in the context of disability,

64. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 830.
65. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 448-49.
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because its position at the top of the substantive equality scale most
explicitly and directly frames the question of equality as a tradeoff
between positive and negative substantive changes. By examining
how the biological/social divide fosters this tension to undermine
disability rights, we can better understand the problems of the
broader equality paradigm.
II. LIMITING WORKERS' COMPENSATION THROUGH BIOLOGICAL
STATUS

The legal right to workers' compensation benefits is not generally
framed as a right to equality for persons with work-related
disabilities. As Matthew Diller explains, disability law has divided
into two prongs, with government benefits separated from equality.
The separation has developed precisely because the disadvantages of
disability have been framed as problems of biology separate from
social prejudice.66 Workers' compensation tends to be construed not
as an issue of civil rights, but as part of the social safety net providing
substantive income assistance. In that view, workers' compensation
benefits help alleviate the real and relevant socioeconomic harm
deemed to result from changes in a physiological condition caused by
workplace injury. 67 However, by positioning the disadvantages of
disability as a problem of substantive equal rights, the ADA breaks
down the division between the "civil" rights identified with equality
and the welfare state's "social" rights correcting substantive
disadvantages.68 For that reason, examining workers' compensation's
changing definition of disability can help shed light on the more overt
confusion about substantive equality in the ADA.

66. Matthew Diller, DissonantDisabilityPolicies: The Tensions between the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct and FederalDisability Benefit Programs,76 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1006
(1998).
67. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, PrivateInsurance,Social Insurance,and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision ofCompensationfor Illness andInjury, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
75, 98 (1993) (situating workers' compensation in a fragmented fabric of social welfare and tort
protections).
68. See Diller, supranote 66, at 1082 (concluding that the neat division between disability
benefits and civil rights represents outdated views of disability that the ADA aimed to change).
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A. CompensatingMedical "Impairment,"Not Work Disability
Beginning in the late 1980s, insurers and employers mobilized 69a
nationwide campaign to reform state workers' compensation laws.
One goal was to change the method of defining disability in
compensation awards for workers sustaining permanent partial
injuries, which make up the bulk of workers' compensation benefit
costs. 70 For many permanent injuries and illnesses, states traditionally
determined benefit amounts through individualized estimates of
injured workers' future wage loss, considering not only the nature of
the injury but also workers' age, skills, education, and local labor
market conditions. 7' Reform advocates instead promoted medical
impairment, separate from socioeconomic factors, as the basis for
calculating compensation amounts.72 Consistent with this goal, most
states now require or recommend use of the American Medical
Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,
commonly known as the AMA Guides, as a key part of determining
workers' compensation benefits.73
Political efforts to increase use of the AAMA Guides in workers'
compensation have continued through the first decade of the twentyfirst century.74 Substantial changes in the AMA Guides' methodology
69. McCluskey, supranote 42, at 704-08.
70. Id.at 830-34.
71. Id. at 833.
72. Id. at 835-41. For a discussion of the questions raised by using medical status as the
definition of disability for determining social security benefits, see Lance Liebman, The
Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the
Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARv. L. REV. 833, 842-47 (1976).
73.

AM. MED. ASS'N, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT § 2.1(a),

at 20 (Christopher R. Brigham & Robert D. Rondinelli eds., 6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter AMA
GUIDES, 6th ed.] (noting forty-four states and two commonwealths requiring use of the AMA
GUIDES); see also AMA GUIDES REs. CTR., OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES: AMA

GUIDES HANDBOOK tbl.1 (2009), http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20090916052048
_large.pdf (identifying thirty-one states with statutes directing use of the AMA Guides).
74. See Impairment Resources, National Presentations on Driving Accurate Impairment
Ratings, May 2009, http://www.impairment.com/NationalPresentationsOnDrivingAccurate
lmpairmentRatings.htm (reporting that the Senior Contributing Editor of the AMA Guides
received standing ovations for featured speeches advocating the impairment ratings as a costcutting measure to two leading workers' compensation insurance trade associations at their
2009 annual meetings); Todd D. McFarren, AMA Guides, Sixth Edition Arrive on the Scene,
LEXISNEXIS WORKERS' COMP. LAW CTR., Dec. 18, 2008, http://law.lexisnexis.com/practice

areas/Workers-Compensation-Law-Blog/Workers-Compensation/AMA-Guides-Sixth-Edition-
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and impairment ratings have fueled ongoing controversy and
confusion. 5 The Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides, published in 2008
(and supplemented with extensive corrections shortly afterward),76
declares itself as a "paradigm shift" from the Fifth Edition." As of
2009, nine or ten states had adopted the Sixth Edition, but the Fifth
Edition (2001) of the AMA Guides remained the most commonly
authorized version, while a number of states continued to require use
of the Fourth Edition (1993) or Third Edition (1988) or did not
specify which edition to use. Some states using the AMA Guides
have explicitly rejected the Sixth Edition due to concerns about
benefit reductions, cost, complexity, or validity.79
The AMA Guides provide standardized directions for physicians to
quantify the degree of impairment of various specific body parts and
organs, and to then translate these ratings into more general
numerical ratings of larger body regions.8 s The ratings are converted
to a measurement of "whole person" impairment for use in legal
proceedings. 8' For example, the Sixth Edition tells an evaluating
Arrive-on-the-Scene (reporting that the updated edition of the AMA Guides accelerates a
dangerously successful political effort to reduce workers' benefits, and noting that California
reformed its workers' compensation laws in 2005 to adopt the AMA Guides' disability
determinations).
75. For a summary of state controversies concerning the Sixth Edition, see Diana Ferriter,
Bureau Chief, Workers' Compensation Claims Assistance, Mont. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 6th
Edition of the AMA Guides to Permanent Impairment, Aug. 20, 2009, http://erd.dli.mt.gov/
wcstudyproject/sixth ed amaguidespermanent.pdf.
76. See AMA Guides, 6th ed., supra note 73; Am. Med. Ass'n, Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, Clarifications and Corrections (2008) (providing fiftytwo pages of errata).
77. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supranote 73, § 1.1, at 2.
78. See AMA GUIDES RES. CTR. STAFF, supra note 73 (counting nine states using the
sixth edition as of July 2009); Impairment Resources, Use of the AMA Guides by State,
http://www.impairment.com/Use of AMAGuides.htm (counting ten states using the Sixth
Edition.).
79. See, e.g., DWIGHT T. LOVAN, COMM'R, KY. OFFICE OF WORKER'S CLAIMS,
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT (2009), http://www.labor.Ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/DC046C16-FOFF-

4BB5-98B8-7C1CE7E92D02/0/CommissionerReportonAMAGuides.pdf (concluding that the
state should continue to use the Fifth Edition); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 876-2.4 (2009)
(regulation directing use of the Fifth Edition); 2009 NEV. STAT. 3030 (amending law directing
use of the most recent edition to instead require use of the Fifth Edition, in legislation enacted
over the governor's veto in 2009).
80. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supranote 73, § 2.1"(a), at 20, (discussing the typical use ofthe
AMA Guides).
81. Id.
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physician that a fracture of a particular bone in the middle finger,
treated surgically and resulting in permanent mild deformity and
pain, rates a six percent impairment of the finger.82 In the Sixth
Edition, a six percent middle finger impairment dictates a two percent
impairment of the hand, which in turn equals a one percent upper
extremity impairment and then a one percent impairment rating for
the "whole person. 83 The "whole person" percentage rating is the
same regardless of social and environmental factors such as what that
"whole person" does for a living. A bank president and a meatcutter
would get the same impairment rating for a fractured finger even
though the meatcutter is likely to lose her job (and her means of
income) due to the injury while the bank president's income is likely
to be unaffected.
The argument for relying on the AMA Guides' impairment ratings
rather than general evidence of wage loss holds that the AMA Guides
more accurately and easily sort real from illegitimate claims of
disability. 84 The change from wage loss to impairment determinations
appears to ground workers' compensation in objective health status,
scientifically determined by experts, with the mushy sociolegal
factors peeled away. Estimations of future wage loss are inevitably
subjective, contingent, and contestable, dependent on workers'
behavior, on employers' behavior, and on broader social conditions.
By relying on medical impairment status instead, proponents of the
AMA Guides argue that states will reduce administrative costs and
fraudulent claims, thereby benefiting truly disabled workers as well
as their employers. 85
The AMA Guides' professed value depends on carefully
differentiating its medical impairment ratings from sociolegal
disability determinations. The AMA Guides' stated goal is "to provide
82. Id. at 413 ex.15-2, 393 tbl.15-2 (giving a conversion factor from middle finger to hand
of twenty percent).
83. Id. at413 ex.15-2.
84. See McCluskey, supra note 42, at 838-39 & n.755 (discussing and criticizing this
argument). For a critical discussion of similar reasoning and resulting questions about the use of
medical status to define disability for determining social security benefits, see Liebman, supra
note 72, at 842-47.
85. McCluskey, supra note 42, at 838 & n.755 (citing arguments and giving contrary
evidence).
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a standardized, objective approach to evaluating medical
impairments '' 86 separate from the contingent, complex social and
economic factors that go into determining "work disability., 87 The
AMA Guides draw on the social model of disability to explain that,
unlike impairment, "disability" is "context specific, not inherent in
the individual, but a function of the interaction of the individual and
the environment., 88 In bold print, the Fifth Edition explains that
"disability" is an "alteration of an individual's capacity to meet
personal, social or occupational demands or statutory or regulatory
requirements because of an impairment." 89
The Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides somewhat revises this
conceptual framework by defining disability as "activity limitations
and/or participation restrictions in an individual with a health
condition, disorder, or disease." 90 This definition partially retreats
from the previous overt placement of "impairment" as the
determining cause of broader socioeconomic limitations.91 The Sixth
Edition recognizes that the relationships between bodily functions
and activities or participations are not "linear or unidirectional." 92 Yet
the AMA Guides continues to reinforce and privilege the idea of a
core objective biological status measurable apart from these
subjective and tangential social actions (activities and participation).
The Sixth Edition explains that its impairment ratings enable
physicians to give a "quantitative estimate of losses to the individual
as a result of their health condition, disorder, or disease., 93 It
distinguishes this medically measured loss from assessments of "the
full array of human functional activities and participations that are
required for comprehensive disability determinations. 94

86. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.2(a), at 20; AM. MED. ASS'N, GUIDES TO
THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 1 (Linda Cocchiarella & Gunnar B.J.

Andersson eds., 5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter AMA GUIDES, 5th ed.].
87. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 4-5; see also id. § 1.2b, at 8-9
(distinguishing work disability from impairment); AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d,
at 5 (distinguishing impairment, based on medical expertise, from disability determinations).

88. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supranote 86, § 1.2b, at 8.
89. Id.
90. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supranote 73, § 1.3d, at 5.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The AMA Guides explains that impairment refers to "functional
limitations, 9 5 or more precisely, the decrease in an individual's
overall ability to perform activities of daily living. 96 But what
distinguishes this functional incapacity for activities that counts as
the scientifically measurable health status, from the contextual
functional incapacity identified as disability?
The AMA Guides defines impairment as "a loss, loss of use, or
derangement of any body part, organ system or organ function." 97 A
"loss, loss of use, or derangement" is further defined as "a change
from a normal or 'preexisting' state." ' But how do the AMA Guides
decide what functioning counts as "normal"? It determines the "range
or zone representing healthy functioning," a status which the AMA
Guides explains "varies with age, gender, and other factors such as
In this circular reasoning, the AMA
environmental conditions."
Guides distinguishes the inherent biological condition from
contextual social functioning by measuring that biological condition
in light of expectations about the individual's ability to function in
particular social contexts. Health status does not neatly precede
functional
ability; instead, functional ability determines and precedes
100
status.
95. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supranote 86, § 1.2a, at 4.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 1.2a, at 2. The Sixth Edition inserts the word "significant" before "loss." AMA
GUIDES, 6th ed., supranote 73, § 1.3d, at 5.
98. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 2; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed.,
supra note 73, § 1.3a, at 3 (also defining impairment as physiological functions and body parts
that "can vary from the normal state, in terms ofloss or deviations").
99. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 2; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed.,
supra note 73, at 612.
100. The diagram introducing the Fifth Edition fudges this contradiction, drawing
"impairment" distinct from and presumably placed prior to functional limitation, with one-way
arrows pointing from impairment and functional limitation to disability, but then also
suggesting possible reverse causation by adding another set of arrows running both ways
between impairment and functional limitation. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2b, at
8. The Sixth Edition explicitly rejects the traditional unidirectional scheme moving from
pathology to impairment to disability. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 4 fig.l.2.
Instead, it offers a more complex diagram, with two-way arrows connecting body functions and
structures (on the left) to activities (in the center) and then to participation (on the right), along
with two-way arrows linking all of these to underlying categories of "environmental" and
"personal" factors. Id. However, this diagram links this entire scheme (with two-way arrows) to
an overarching category at the top marked "Health condition, Disorder or Disease," which
suggests that medical status remains at the core and also the dominant factor. Id. § 1.3, at 3.
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The AMA Guides is therefore problematic for determining
disability benefits not simply because it excludes some
socioeconomic factors relevant to measuring income loss. More
fundamentally, medical impairment ratings fail to measure
physiological health status separate from disability. In her historical
analysis of the ideology and politics of disability, Deborah Stone
concludes that the distinction between impairment and disability is
"liturgical cant": it gets its validity from repetition and faith, not
empirical evidence or logic.' 0' The concept of impairment inevitably
incorporates and depends on social judgment, as legal scholar Ellen
02
Smith Pryor wrote in reviewing the AMA Guides' Third Edition.
Just as the formalistic determination of "difference" in equality law
requires an assumption of a substantive norm for differentiating, the
formalistic determination of impaired function in laws governing
substantive benefits requires an assumption of a substantive norm for
determining functioning. With disability, as with race and sex, the
biological or scientific core status has meaning only in relation to
functioning in a particular social, economic, and political context.
Indeed, the concept of "medical impairment" seems primarily useful
as a strategy for removing contested judgments about disability from
political, social, and legal scrutiny.
The AMA Guides' ratings perform a sleight of hand, offering
"impairment" as a fixed medical status, more objectively measurable
than contingent social functioning. But then the AMA Guides
switches to contingent functional impact as the more objectively
measurable medical fact necessary to reveal an ever-elusive
underlying biological status. The AMA Guides makes continual
normative decisions about which functions to measure as deviations
from "normal" bodily function according to which standards, and
under which conditions.
Even at the micro level of individual anatomical parts or organs,
the AMA Guides cannot escape tricky and contested value judgments

101. DEBORAH STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 107-08 (1984). Similarly, disability studies
scholar Simi Linton calls for a deconstruction of impairment to match the deconstruction of
disability. SiMi LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 138 (1998).
102. Ellen Smith Pryor, FlawedPromises:A CriticalEvaluationofthe American Medical
Association's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 964, 968
(1990) (book review).
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about what counts as normal bodily functioning. Pryor's critique of
the AMA Guides compared how the Third Edition ignored loss of
sensation in rating female genital functioning but counted loss of
sensation in rating male genital functioning. 10 3 Beyond such
obviously discreditable bias, even generally accepted social norms
are little help in resolving many contestable judgments of normal
physiological functioning. For example, in measuring the degree of
impairment from a given level of muscle weakness in a hand, should
it matter whether you are measuring the person's dominant hand?
The AMA Guides Fifth Edition concludes it does not. 10 4
Similarly, should age and individual interest matter in determining
deviation from normal function of a body part? When measuring
hearing loss, the AMA Guides determines it does not; impairment
10 6
ratings are not lowered for old age105 or raised for bird watchers,
but instead are based on a standardized assumption of capacity to
hear "everyday sounds.' 0 7 Nonetheless, when it comes to penile
injuries, the AMA Guides gives physicians the discretion to consider
both age and individual activities, allowing extra impairment points
for men under forty deemed to have active sexual functioning prior to
the injury, while advising downward adjustment of impairment
103. Id.at 969-70. In an audio interview with senior contributing editor Christopher R.
Brigham, an attorney asked why the Sixth Edition rates male loss of sexual function as a fifteen
percent whole person impairment but loss of female sexual function as twenty percent, to which
the senior editor responded "I have no explanation for that" and admitted the ratings were "far
from perfect." Interview with Dr. Christopher Brigham, Senior Contributing Editor, AMA
GUIDES (Apr. 28, 2008), http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2008/04/
workers-comp-the-ama-guides-6th-edition/; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at
141-49, 151-52 (giving fifteen percent as the maximum whole-person rating for male
reproductive disease and giving twenty percent as the maximum whole-person rating for female
reproductive disease).
104. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 16.1, at 435 (noting hand dominance is
relevant to assessing disability rather than impairment).
105. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 11.2c, at 249 (instructing assignment of rating
regardless of age or noise exposure); see also id.§ 11 .2d, at 250 (disregarding individual
hobbies or occupations).
106. Id. § 11.2d, at 250 (disregarding individual hobbies or occupations).
107. Id. § 11.2c, at 249 (instructing assignment of rating regardless of age or noise
exposure); id. § 11.2d, at 250 (disregarding individual hobbies or occupations); id. § I1.2e, at
251 (explaining "everyday" sounds and conditions as basis for the standards).
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ratings for penile injuries in men over sixty-five or for men perceived
as having histories of lower levels of sexual functioning. 108
How should impairment ratings count medical treatment affecting
the functioning of a given bodily part, organ, or system? The AM4
Guides measures hearing loss without considering the mitigating
functional impact of corrective devices (hearing aids), 10 9 reflecting
the theory that impairment is an underlying physiological state
extracted from corrective behavior. Nonetheless, the Sixth Edition's
rating system recognizes that medical treatment can be the main
burden on normal functioning for endocrine conditions such as
diabetes. 1 0 Furthermore, the Sixth Edition changes previous editions'
assumption that surgical treatment is evidence of severity of
musculoskeletal impairment, instead decreeing that surgical treatment
is evidence of improved functioning. 111 A medical expert on Iowa's
task force studying the Sixth Edition explained how this approach
produces illogical results.1 2 For workers appropriately diagnosed and
surgically treated for carpal tunnel syndrome, the AMA Guides would
direct the physician to reject the previously correct diagnosis of
carpal tunnel once surgery is complete, and to instead attribute any
continuing symptoms to
a much lower rated diagnosis of
"nonspecific wrist pain."'' 13
A further normative issue involves the AMA Guides' choice
among various methods of measuring degree of functional loss. In
prior editions, musculoskeletal ratings (which constitute almost
ninety percent of impairment ratings) 1 4 focused on the individual's
range of motion and strength. For example, the Fifth Edition
instructed physicians to test the grip and pinch strength of an
108. Id. § 7.7, at 143.
109. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § ll.a, at 246; AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra
note 73, § 11.1,
at 248.
110. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.8, at 16.
111. Interview with Dr. Christopher Brigham, supranote 103.
112. John Kuhnlein, Iowa Div. of Worker's Comp., Member Report for the Iowa Task
Force Regarding the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent impairment, Sixth Edition,
2008 Iowa AMA Guides Task Force Process Report 6-7 (2008).
113. Id.

114. Videotape: AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition:
New Concepts, Challenges and Opportunities (Christopher R. Brigham ed., 2008), available at
http://www.impairment.com/6/orientation-flash.htm.

2010]

The Biological/Social Divide, Disability, and Equality

137

individual's hand at repeated intervals during an examination with
the injured person sitting in various specified positions.15 In contrast,
the Sixth Edition determines musculoskeletal ratings primarily
through a formal grid of diagnostic classifications, such as whether
the hand injury is located in the muscle, ligament, or bone, with only
minor adjustments for physical examination, clinical measurements,
or functional history. 1 6 By emphasizing fixed classifications over
functional clinical measurements, the Sixth Edition presumably aims
to reduce variations in measurement due to contextual factors such as
effort of the injured person, physician skill, and the testing
environment.
But, while it seems logical to rate decreasing measurements of
grip strength along an increasing scale of impairment severity, the
basis for numerically ranking various formal diagnostic categories
appears less clear, or at least less clearly grounded in medicine rather
than socioeconomic interests." 7 For example, the Sixth Edition gives
a cervical fusion injury a zero to six percent whole person
impairment rating based on its new ranking scheme, while a similar
injury could produce a twenty-five percent whole person rating under
the Fifth Edition.' 8 Similarly, in one example of compressive penile
injury used in both editions, the Sixth Edition downgrades the organ
level impairment rating to three percent (compared to five percent in
the Fifth Edition) because the Sixth Edition assigns a lower rank to
losses classified as involving sensation than to losses classified as
involving "insufficient erection." '" 9 The connection between the AMA
Guides' ratings of relative functional loss and medical expertise is
especially tenuous when the diagnostic criteria for impairment rating
do not track medical criteria used for treatment, as in the carpal
115. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 16.8, at 508.
116. See AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 15.2, at 387 (discussing this new
diagnostic-based impairment approach for upper extremities).
117. For example, one medical expert noted concern that previous editions decided not to
use percentage numbers for rating mental disorders because those numbers "may not translate
very well into reality" and that by assigning numerical percentages, the Sixth Edition "implies a
certainty that doesn't exist." Letter from James Gallagher, Diplomate, Am Bd. of Psychiatry &
Neurology, to Peter Thrill, Att'y, Betty, Neuman & McMahon, P.L.C. (July 10, 2008);
availableat http://www.iowataskforce.org/wc/amataskforce/jamesgallagher.pdf
118. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 3.
119. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 143, ex.7-25; 144 tbl.7-6.
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tunnel example discussed above. One member of Iowa's task force
on the AMA Guides' revisions reported that the Sixth Edition
involves "little, if any, attempt to actually 'measure' anything," and
that the AMA Guides would be just as valid and far simpler if one
rating were assigned to all classes of
random numerical
20
impairment.'
Indeed, the AMA Guides derives its numerical impairment ratings
not from any testable empirical or clinical evidence or medical
expertise, but from a "consensus" of socioeconomic intuitions from
the AMA Guides' contributors. 12 In a 2001 ruling under the federal
Compensation Act, an
Longshore and Harbor Workers'
administrative law judge decided that the AMA Guides' ratings failed
to satisfy the Daubert122 standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence, citing testimony from the Fifth Edition's lead author for the
upper extremities chapter, who agreed that when it comes to rating a
percent of the body as a whole, "there
finger impairment as a certain
'123
isn't any science about it.
The "consensus" that grounds the ratings has not included legal
experts or representatives of workers' interests, nor has it represented
a broad or scientific sample of medical expertise.124 In its analysis of
the Sixth Edition, Iowa's task force asked the AMA to clarify the
composition of the consensus group for each chapter, but the AMA
declined to provide this information.125 Instead, the AMA provided
only the general list of fifty-three chapter contributors in the AMA

120. MATrHEW DAKE, IOWA Div. OF WORKER'S COMP., AMA GUIDES TASK FORCEREPORT OF MEMBER MATTHEW DAKE 8-9, http://www.iowaworkforce.org/wc/amataskforce/

dakereport.pdf.
121. See AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d, at 5 (defining impairment rating as a
"consensus-derived percentage estimate of the loss of activity reflecting severity for a given
health condition"). A diverse group of independent experts (not directly linked to the insurance
industry) criticized the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides for lacking validity, internal
consistency, reliability, comprehensiveness, and accessibility. See Emily A. Spieler et al.,
Recommendations to Guide Revision of the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,
283 JAMA 519, 519-23 (2000).
122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
123. Hodgkinson v. Elec. Boat Corp., 35 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 459 (May 18, 2001)
(discussing testimony ofDr. Frank Jones).
124. DAKE, supra note 120, at 2-3 (discussing flawed process of producing "consensus"
without consultation with legal experts).
125. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 9.
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Guides' preface without any identification of individual chapter
authorship or level of involvement. 126 Upon questioning by the task
force, the AMA Guides' senior medical editor explained that the
consensus group for each chapter was drawn from those with national
membership in the relevant medical specialty who also "were
interested enough in the development of an impairment rating process
to volunteer their time and efforts."' 127 He also explained that the
editorial panel was chosen to agree with the lead editors' proposed
paradigm shift. 128 Further undercutting the asserted "consensus," one
state's workers' compensation medical director withdrew from
participation in the Sixth Edition because of disagreement with lead
editors over content and methodology. 129 Another physician on the
AMA Guides' advisory committee, who was a past president of the
American Academy of Disability Evaluating Physicians, expressed
concerns to Iowa's task force about "hidden agendas and biased
allegiances" in the process of developing the Sixth Edition.130
What contested legal and political judgments hide under these
dubious claims to scientific consensus? In rating "whole person"
impairment, the AMA Guides purports to measure capacity to perform
the "activities of daily living," but distinguishes the allegedly
scientific "impairment" measure from subjective "disability" by
considering the loss of ability to perform activities other than work.13 '
In short, "impairment ratings" are largely ratings of non-work
disability that then become presented as an "objective" basis for
evaluating work disability. In effect, the impairment ratings assume a
standard of "normal functioning" based on a person who does not
normally include wage work among their daily activities--or a
126. Id. For the list of chapter contributors, see AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at
VII-VIII.

127. HELENJEAN M. WALLESER, DEPUTY COMM'R, IOWA Div. OF WORKERS COMP., 2008
AMA GUIDES TASK FORCE PROCESS REPORT 4 (2008), http://www.iowaworkforce.org/wc/

amataskforce/2008amaguidesprocessreport.pdf (reporting the response of Robert D. Rondinelli,
M.D.).
128. DAKE, supra note 120, at 3.
129. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 11 (noting the withdrawal of Dr. Alan Colledge as
ground for concern about the "consensus").
130. Id. at 9 (reporting comments of Douglas Martin, M.D., as evidence of problems with
the AMA Guides' "consensus" ratings).
131. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, §§ 1.3d & 1.3e, at 5-6.
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normal person for whom work activities make no significant bodily
demands beyond those encountered in nonwork activities.
Proponents of the AMA Guides have long deflected such criticism
by insisting that the AMA Guides should be used only for measuring
medical conditions, not for directly estimating the sociolegal
condition of work disability. But despite previous editions'
warnings-in bold print-against sociolegal use,"2 the AMA Guides
have no medical use. 13 3 Instead, the AMA Guides' only real purpose
is the sociolegal determination of disability, particularly work
disability. The AMA created the AMA Guides in 1958 as a sociolegal
strategy aimed at making private doctors, rather than government
staff physicians, the source of expertise in social security disability
hearings. 134 Indeed, the Sixth Edition departs from previous editions
by removing the bold print warning and adding a section
acknowledging and affirming the AMA Guides' sociolegal function
for determining workers' compensation benefits. 35 Nonetheless, this
edition retains traditional disclaimers against such use, insisting that
its ratings are only a "first
step' ' 136 that should be supplemented with
137
factors.
socioeconomic
With the promulgation of the Sixth Edition, the AMA Guides has
become a highly commercialized private business, and its links to the
AMA appear superficial or at least obscure.' 38 The Sixth Edition's
senior contributing editor, Christopher R. Brigham, is the chairman of
132. See, e.g., AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supranote 86, at 13.
133. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 20 (stating that "this book is not likely to be
used in the practice of therapeutic medicine"); DAKE, supra note 120, at 2 ("Failing to
acknowledge that the Guides are used exclusively for litigation purposes, represents a
fundamental intellectual dishonesty.").
134. STONE, supra note 101, at 111-12.
135. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 20 (stating that "the primary purpose of the
Guides is to rate impairment to assist adjudicators and others in determining the financial
compensation to be awarded to individuals who, as a result of injury or illness, have suffered
measurable physical and/or psychological loss"). See LOVAN, supra note 79 (noting the Sixth
Edition changes position on the AMA Guides'use).
136. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supranote 73, at 20.
137. See id. at 6 (stating that "The Guides is not intended to be used for direct estimates of
work participation restrictions" and that impairment rating "must be further integrated with
contextual information").
138. See DAKE, supra note 120, at 2-3 (noting that AMA Guides' editors and authors
speaking to Iowa's task force studying the Sixth Edition "always made certain to specify they
were not speaking for the AMA").
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a company focused on the AMA Guides: Impairment Resources,
LLC.139 His business charges high prices for copies of the AMA
Guides and also for a product line of interpretive materials and
trainings likely to be necessary for meaningful use of the Sixth
40
Edition's dauntingly complex and error-prone rating system.1
Although the AMA Guides are incorporated as public law in most
states, the cost of these interpretive materials lies well outside the
reach of most unrepresented injured workers and most legal
professionals, scholars, and physicians who do not specialize in
workers' compensation. 141
Further, Brigham's Impairment Resources company combines its
economic interest in producing and interpreting the AMA Guides with
an overriding business and political interest in reducing workers'
compensation benefit costs for insurers and employers. 42 The
company's self-description states:
Impairment Resources, LLC (formerly Brigham & Associates)
provides you with unique, proven strategies that drive accurate
impairment ratings and result in a superb return on investment.
Statistics demonstrate that most impairment ratings are
erroneously inflated and cost insurers and employers nationally
billions of dollars. Before the development of the suite of
services offered by Impairment Resources, LLC, adjusters,
139. Impairment Resources, Profiles, http://www.impairment.com/profiles.htm (last visited
July 10, 2010).
140. Impairment Resources, Products, http://www.impairment.com/products.htm (last
visited July 10, 2010).
141. See KUHNLEIN, supranote 112, at 8 (reporting that physicians should expect to spend
twenty-five to thirty hours of self-study and eight hours of training to learn the Sixth Edition,
and that tracking the errata alone took one doctor 3.5 hours); Marion D. Mormann, IOWA Dlv.
OF WORKER'S COMP., THE AMA GUIDES SIcH EDITION TASK FORCE MEMBER REPORT

(2008) (discussing the costly impact of the Sixth Edition's complexity on physicians, claimants,
attorneys, and administrators); LOVAN, supra note 79 , at 6-7 (reporting testimony from
medical experts that fewer physicians would be willing to perform impairment ratings under the
Sixth Edition due to its increased complexity).
142. See KUHNLEIN, supranote 112, at 11-12 (noting that Dr. Brigham denied his defenseside business orientation in discussions with the Iowa task force but that these ties are clearly
evident from his publications and from his company's web site); see, e.g., DVD: Christopher R.
Brigham et al., Symptom Magnification, Deception, and Malingering: Identification through
Distraction, Tests and Other Techniques (SEAK, Inc. 2000) (focusing on methods for
challenging workers' injury claims).
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to cost
physicians and attorneys had limited tools available
43
effectively analyze and resolve such inaccuracies. 1
Aside from the AMA Guides' socioeconomic purposes, an
important effect of its slippery construction of objective
"impairment" distinct from subjective disability is to undermine the
political and legal legitimacy of many individual claims for
permanent work disability. By presenting a highly technical and
seemingly scientific numerical rating of biological status, the AMA
Guides' ratings serve to skew disability determinations even if those
determinations supplement the ratings with socioeconomic evidence.
The thing most understandable about "impairment" is that it is
supposed to be "more objective" than claims of work disability. The
AMA Guides' impairment ratings mainly function to prove that work
disability is a suspect status produced by subjective attitudes and
behavior that must be sharply limited and only grudgingly rewarded.
B. DiscoveringImpairmentand CoveringDisability
This shift to impairment status in workers' compensation echoes
the "covering" requirement that Yoshino describes in the context of
sexual orientation. Consider the example of Gary Brummett, a
construction worker without a high school diploma, who suffered a
permanent back injury on the job in Kentucky, after that state adopted
an impairment rating system in the 1990s.'4 Before his injury, he
earned $35,000 a year and owned a three bedroom home. 45 Under
the prior wage-loss system, his employer would have been
responsible for assuming or mitigating the risk that Brummett's back
injury would be more costly than a similar injury for someone not
dependent on back strength for his or her income. Under that
previous system, Brummett could have received a $73,000 lump sum
award, giving him a chance at moving to another middle-class career
143. Impairment Resources, About Us, http://www.impairment.com/about_us.htm
visited July 10, 2010).

(last

144. James N. Ellenberger, The Battle over Workers' Compensation, in 10 NEW
SOLUTIONS: A JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 217, 217-

36 (2000) (discussing and criticizing the change from wage loss to impairment ratings for
determining permanent partial benefits).
145. Id. at 217.
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(e.g., by funding advanced education or the development of a small
business). 146 Instead, Brummett received only $7,400, because the
AMA Guides ranked his medical impairment as minimal, despite his
severe socioeconomic loss. 14 7 This system forces injured workers like
Brummett to bear the high injury costs that might have been avoided
had they chosen a different career, in a different location, with a
different level of education. With this low award, Brummett's
employer not only does not have to compensate the actual wage loss,
but also has reduced incentives to mitigate such losses (for example
by improving safety or by providing workplace accommodations that
would allow reemployment after injury).
Like the gay man required to cover for the mutable, cultural
aspects of his identity-to bear the costs of acting straight-the
injured worker is required to cover for the mutable, cultural aspects
of his or her identity, despite the cost. In this case, Brummett
mitigated or "accommodated" his wage loss by ruining his credit,
losing his house, and subsisting on a minimum wage job delivering
pizza. In short, workers like Brummett deserve protection for their
incapacitated status, but that status is reduced to a fixed core
impairment, requiring them to cover for supposedly peripheral
behavioral contingencies and choices.
In the case of disability, "covering" paradoxically ends up serving
to "uncover" at the same time, tightening the double bind of
substantive equality. For the injured worker, the requirement of
covering-mitigating non-essential constraints-ironically works to
reinforce the covered person's status as different and incapable of
rational choice. The mitigation that most seriously injured workers in
manual jobs are able to achieve without more economic support
involves taking low-paying work, giving up financial security,
depending on non-work income from relatives and taxpayers, or all
of the above. This "covering" requirement then means many workers
with serious, permanent disabilities from work must accept the loss
of their status as middle-class workers, or even as financially
independent workers. That result, of course, is precisely the
longstanding status problem that the workers' compensation and
146. Id.at 218.
147. See id

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 33:109

disability rights movements arguably aimed to correct. Those
movements challenged the view that disability normally and naturally
leads to socioeconomic subordination, and instead argued that law
create the conditions for greater social and economic
reforms could
48
capacity. 1
III. LIMITING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION THROUGH SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION

As many scholars have analyzed extensively, judicial narrowing
of the definition of "disability" has stymied the ADA's push toward
substantive equality. 149 In particular, critics focused on four Supreme
Court cases that tightened the threshold requirement of who counts as
a person with a disability protected under the ADA. 1 50 Responding to
efforts to restore that substantive promise, Congress redefined
"disability" in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"),
which took effect at the beginning of 2009.151 The ADAAA directly
rejects the Court's social constructivist narrowing of disability, but
also takes steps to resist a medical impairment model of disability. In
doing so, the ADAAA suggests some avenues for moving beyond the
biological/social divide toward a more meaningful substantive vision
of disability and equality.
148. For a theory of law focused on enhancing human capacity, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).
149. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 247-57 (2001) (finding evidence that outcomes for plaintiffs under
the ADA are worse than outcomes for plaintiffs under other civil rights statutes); Diller, supra
note 46, at 47-48; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal AntiDiscriminationLaw: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do about It?, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of
Disability under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321, 321, 370-74
(2000) (criticizing the 1999 Supreme Court rulings restricting the definition of disability);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword:Backlash against the ADA: InterdisciplinaryPerspectives
andImplicationsfor Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7-8 (2000)
(summarizing scholarship criticizing the narrow judicial interpretation of the ADA).
150. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 686 (2002).
151. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
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A. ProtectingSocialFunctioning,Not ImpairmentStatus
Relying on the impairment versus disability distinction, the
original and amended versions of the ADA define disability as a
"physical impairment that substantially limits one or more ...major
life activities," "a record" of such an impairment, or as "being
regarded as having" such an impairment. 15 2 This definition suggests
the core physiological condition as the primary cause of disadvantage
(whether real or perceived), with the incapacity for social functioning
as a contingent effect.
In three cases decided in 1999, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs
were not persons with disabilities protected by the ADA because they
were able to take adaptive steps to mitigate the limiting effects of
their physical conditions. 153 By denying that the plaintiffs' physical
limitations satisfied the threshold requirement of a "disability," the
Court did not reach the substantive questions of whether the
detrimental employment action was due to unlawful disability
discrimination or instead to the plaintiffs' failure to satisfy legitimate
job qualifications with or without reasonable accommodations. In
Sutton v. United Air Lines, for example, the Court denied disability
status to two airline pilots who had visual impairments correctable by
eyeglasses; 5 4 in Murphy v. United ParcelService, the Court denied
disability status to a mechanic with high blood pressure controlled by
medication;'5 5 and in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court
denied disability status to a truck driver with monocular vision who
could make subconscious cognitive adjustments to compensate for
his visual condition. 5 6 In Sutton, Justice O'Connor explained it
would be too hypothetical and speculative to determine disability
based on medical status alone, without looking at the workers' actual
behavior and social context,' 57 even though the real problem in the
case was that the employer did exactly that in deciding the pilots
were unqualified for the job.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(A)-(C) (Supp. 2009).
Albertson's,Inc., 527 U.S. 555; Murphy, 527 U.S. 516; Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518.
Albertsons,Inc., 527 U.S. at 558-59, 565-66.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
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In contrast to workers' compensation, the Court looked for real
disability by focusing on contingent social functioning instead of
underlying physical status. Ironically, these ADA decisions use social
constructivism to reinforce rather than to resist the medical model's
idea that the "real" harm triggering protection against inequality
comes from an essential individual biological impairment, real or
perceived. The Court seems to assume that once an employee's
contingent actions have mitigated the (real or perceived) functional
impact of the core biological harm, no harm remains for protection
from discrimination.
In Sutton, that understanding of social overlay on a biological core
explained the Court's medicalized approach to defining disability
under the alternative "regarded as" prong of the ADA's threshold
requirement for establishing protected status as disabled.
Commentators had long assumed the "regarded as" option was
designed precisely for the problem raised by these cases-that
discrimination may include stereotypical social perceptions of
disability status not based on the person's specific functional
abilities. 158 Nonetheless, Sutton held that the airline pilots with
159
correctable impaired vision failed that alternative test for disability.
The vision-impaired pilots were not "regarded as" having
impairments that substantially limited major life activities because
there was no evidence that the employer perceived their impaired
vision limited them from doing anything more than the particular job
at issue. 160 The Court assumed that there was not even any perceived
harm left to protect when an employer's contingent perceptions of the
worker's biological status do not proceed to attribute sufficiently
substantial and broad functional harm to that biological condition. 161
In these cases, the Court uses the division between social function
and biological essence to erode formal equal treatment protection as
well as substantive equality. The Court's analysis reveals how that
division undermines the two equality scales it appears to support.
158. See Feldblum, supra note 149, at 157-59.
159. Sutton, 527 U.S. at488-89.
160. Id. at489-93.
161. See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008) (using linguistic analysis to explain and critique
Sutton's interpretation of the "regarded as" prong).
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This framework creates a bind in which the more a person
successfully acts to satisfy functional requirements for a job despite a
potentially disabling physiological condition, the less protection they
have against harmful treatment based solely on prejudiced views
about the functional impact of their biological condition. Because the
Court reduces disability's essence to real or perceived individual
functional limitations, it deems irrelevant any unequal treatment
directed at socially imposed disability status rather than on individual
functional limits (whether biological or social).As Jill Anderson
argues, that misguided logic could lead to the result that the law fails
to protect what might appear to be the penultimate instance of
disability discrimination: an employer who simply refuses to hire
regardless of specific function or
anyone identified as disabled,
62
perceived.
or
real
condition,
In the 2002 case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing,Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams, the Court further narrowed the threshold definition of
protected disability status. 163 Toyota extended the individual
contingencies that cancel disability status to include not just adaptive
equipment, medical treatment, or enhanced functional abilities, but
also the "choice" of an occupation requiring work-specific functional
capacity. In Toyota, the Court again ruled that medical status was not
a sufficient basis for disability because of the potential for individuals
to eliminate the difference or limitation constituting that status by
compensating for their medical conditions.1 64 The Court decided that
an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome was not
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, even if her medical
condition actually limited her physical ability to do her job. 165 The
Court established that an inability to perform manual tasks associated
with a specific job not common to most people, as opposed to
ordinary personal or household tasks, is not a substantial limit on a
major life activity. 166 Again writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the manual tasks of an assembly line job are not of
162. See id at 1061-63 (explaining the intent of the ADA to cover discrimination per se or
discrimination by proxy).
163. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 187-88.
166. Id-at 200-02.
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central importance to most people's daily lives, unlike bathing,
eating, or brushing one's teeth. 167 The implicit logic of the decision is
that the injured worker in the case had the obligation to mitigate the
functional limitations of her medical condition by withdrawing from
her assembly line job and sticking
to the limited gardening and
68
1
perform.
still
could
she
housework
With this decision, the Court's social constructivist reasoning
comes full circle to tighten the bind against substantive equality as
well as narrowing formal equality. Strong evidence that a
physiological condition really does substantively constrain a person's
functional capacity at work does not help to establish that she is
potentially deserving of substantive accommodation, or even that she
has a real disability deserving of at least minimal formal protection
against bare prejudice. The Court assumed that the fact of real
functional disadvantage demonstrates that the problem is the injured
person's attempted functioning (i.e., trying to retain her assembly line
job) rather than her physiological status. Although this logic could be
extended to completely eviscerate employment discrimination
protections-one can never be essentially disabled for purposes of
employment, because work is always a contingent behavior-the
Court does allow broad non-work functional incapacity to constitute
proof of disability status worthy of workplace protection. If the
central harm of inequality is assumed to be real or imagined relevant
individual biological failure, both formal and substantive equality
will always seem suspect to the degree the individual's functioning is
mediated through his69 or her contingent social action outside the
context of disability. 1
B. Discovering Conduct, CoveringImpairment Status
For disability, as with sexual orientation, the threshold step of
formal recognition of protected status blurs into substantive
167. Id. at 201-02.
168. See id. at 202 (noting that evidence suggested that after her condition worsened the
plaintiff could still "tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the
house").
169. See YOSHINO, supra note 59 and accompanying text; Kessler, supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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judgments about the merits of affirmatively accommodating that
status. Formal recognition of identity itself will seem like undeserved
affirmative special accommodation for particularly problematic
behavior or ideas if we start from a presumption that an identity
category (such as sexual orientation or disability) is a sign of failed
individual functioning that can be legitimately penalized or pitied.
That is, if the disadvantages of disability are presumed to largely
result from relevant individual failures rather than social prejudice or
structural injustice, then the protected status as disabled will tend to
seem more suspect than employers' harnfil treatment.
As with the paradigm of forced heterosexual assimilation that
Yoshino criticizes, the Court's social constructionist approach to
disability assumes the disadvantaged individual should be expected to
"cover" for her or his real or perceived loss of functioning. In Toyota,
the Court's doubts about the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
disability claim may have reflected its deeper doubts about the
reasonableness of her decision to seek accommodations for her workrelated disability when she could instead "cover" that functional loss
by quietly withdrawing to the more "normal" work of tending to her
garden and kitchen.1 70 Applying Yoshino's schema of forced
assimilation in sexual orientation law, 171 the Court's reasoning seems
consistent with a problematic judgment that if medical treatment and
enlightened attitude cannot "convert" an assembly line worker with
carpal tunnel injuries to pain-free hand movement, then at least she
should not "flaunt" her condition by demanding that her employer
affirmatively recognize and respond to her disability as normal and
deserving of structural change.
For both the ADA and workers' compensation, this implicit
"covering" requirement reflects an assimilationist judgment that
workers deserve protection against the disadvantages of disability
only to the extent workers comport with workplace norms that
normally and naturally disadvantage persons with disabilities. By
making elusive "real" biological constraint the basis for both
threshold formal status and for substantive protection, the Court's
170. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
171. See YOSHrNO, supra note 59 and accompanying text.

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 33:109

social constructivist approach to the ADA does the same work as the
biological impairment under workers' compensation.
C. ADAAA: Restoring Medical Impairment orResisting
Social/BiologicalDivision?
The
ADAAA
directly
overrules
social
constructivist
interpretations by explicitly prohibiting consideration of mitigating
measures in determining whether a person satisfies the definition of
disability. 72 What matters for the threshold determination of
disability status is the presumed underlying biological condition,
without considering how the presumed effect of that condition on
social functioning might be lessened by the use of assistive devices,
medical treatment or services, compensating behavior or functional
capacities. 173 In part, this definition seems to focus protection on a
fixed biological condition measured in terms of apparently
unmediated functional impact. The ADAAA pushes back against the
Court's social constructivist reasoning by clarifying the functional
impact that defines impairment: the major life activities counting as
normal functioning include not just socially relevant behaviors such
as working, dressing, talking, and walking, but also physiological
processes like normal cell growth, immunity, and reproduction.' 74 In
addition, it clarifies that an impairment that is episodic or in
remission qualifies as a protected disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active, again recognizing
an
175
underlying biological status even when that status is not fixed.
Nonetheless, the ADAAA to some extent resists the medical
model of disability by partly displacing individual biology as the core
constraint subject to protection against discrimination. The ADAAA
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2009); see also ADA Amendments Acts of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3556 (specifying the amendments' purpose of overturning
the Supreme Court's rulings); Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 204 (2008) (explaining the concerns and efforts leading to this
statutory reversal ofthe decisions narrowing the definition of disability).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). The ADAAA specifies one exception for the use of
"ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses," so that a normal eyeglass-wearer is deemed to have
normal functioning rather than identity as disabled. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii).
174. Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(B).
175. Id. § 12102(4)(D).
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overrides the Court's cramped approach to the "regarded as" prong of
the disability definition. It provides, somewhat awkwardly, that the
"regarded as" definitional prong is satisfied by a showing that an
actual impairment is perceived without the need to further show that
this impairment is regarded as substantially limiting a major life
activity. 17 6 This clarification recognizes that the harm of false or
irrational perceptions of disability can be about problematic
externally imposed social status, not just mistaken ideas about
specific individual functional failures.
The Act also specifically restricts employment criteria based on
uncorrected vision, 77 thereby taking a step toward changing the focus
of social construction of disability status from the question of
whether a biologically impaired individual can nonetheless act
normal to the question of whether facially neutral and normal social
policies and structures can nonetheless be dysfunctional. Finally, the
ADAAA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual on
the basis of disability,"1 78 replacing the prior prohibition on
discriminating against "a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual."' 7 9 This change displaces
the individual's status as the essential source of the problematic
treatment and more directly emphasizes that such a status can be the
contingent result of external imposition of unjust limitations. More
generally, the ADAAA affirms Congress's intent to shift the focus of
the law from deciding who is "really" disabled to deciding
whether
180
discrimination on the basis of disability has occurred.
Nonetheless, the ADAAA partly continues to focus on sorting
biological from social status. It explicitly removes any substantive
accommodation requirement for those plaintiffs who rest their
disability status on social construction under the "regarded as" prong,
rather than on proof of sufficient actual functional limitation.' 8 1This
change risks entrenching the bifurcation of disability into formal and
substantive equality tracks in a way that undermines both. In the
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. § 12102(3)(A).
Id. § 12113(c).
Id. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557.
See id. at 3553-54.
Id. at 3557-58.
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implicit logic of this change, if the disadvantage at issue involves
social status rather than a real functional limitation, then no
"substantive" social change is necessary to alleviate that
disadvantage. In this narrow view, without a "real" biological
limitation relevant to social functioning, equality need only ensure
that the person perceived as disabled is treated the same as those not
so perceived. However, as critical theory has shown outside the
context of disability, the line dividing formal equality from
substantive accommodation is slippery and subjective, so that efforts
to require neutral treatment will often seem like demands for
undeserved special accommodation.
For example, prior to the ADAAA, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the ADA could require an employer to make reasonable
accommodations for a plaintiff who could only establish her status as
disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the Act's disability
definition. 8 2 The plaintiff had successfully performed her job as a
product transporter in a fish factory despite suffering from vertigo. 183
The court decided she did not establish an actual disability within the
meaning of the statute because of a lack of evidence of any
impairment other than her ability to stare continuously at moving
objects.' 84 Nonetheless, the court agreed that her lack of "real"
disability status did not bar her claim for a workplace accommodation
after a new supervisor modified her job to include conveyor belt
work, which she argued was not essential to her position as product
transporter.1 85 The court's decision recognizes that employment
policies appearing neutral on their face and as applied-such as the
decision to restructure factory work duties-might sometimes be
imposed without substantial legitimate reason, thereby rendering a
person disabled who might not otherwise be. 186 For example, the new
supervisor may have imposed the conveyor belt duties over the fish
182. D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005).
183. Id.at 1222.
184. Id. at 1226-27, 1234.
185. Id. at 1234-39.
186. The court supported its reasoning by referring to a Supreme Court ruling requiring
consideration of reasonable accommodations for a teacher who satisfied only the "regarded as"
definitional prong of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, on which the ADA was modeled. Id.
at 1236.
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factory worker's objections, not out of real evidence of (or concern
for) any impact on factory productivity, but simply because of
irrational fear, disgust, or callous indifference toward the plaintiff
based on her perceived bodily weakness or abnormality.
Under the ADAAA, the "regarded as" status could preclude
judicial scrutiny of such job policies and structures, so that,
ironically, workers' lack of real disability would in some cases mean
their employment disadvantages are attributed to real individual
biological impairment rather than social stereotypes. Disability rights
advocates argue that the expanded definition of actual disability
means many such plaintiffs nonetheless will have a right to
reasonable accommodation on the ground that they have sufficiently
substantial real physiological impairments. 87 For example, because
episodic impairments are included under the actual disability prong,
and because bodily functions are included as major life activities, a
plaintiffs vertigo could reasonably be deemed a "real" rather than
perceived disability.' 88 But this means the amendments will partly
work to reinforce emphasis on the individual person's "real"
functional failure rather than on workplace bias.
In addition, some biological conditions-like facial scars-may
arguably have no impact on "real" bodily functioning but may be
particularly susceptible to harmful prejudice. 89 Although the
expanded "regarded as" prong will extend coverage to those whose
disability is more clearly a perceived status than a real function,
without the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, the
substantive protection provided is less clear. A retail store policy
requiring employees to have straight teeth and unscarred skin might
readily be understood as discrimination based on perceived disability
rather than on "real" and relevant job qualifications. As Christine Joll
has discussed, these cases most obviously blur the purported line
between formal and substantive equality, because changing such
policies may have substantive costs for employers in a society where
stereotypes of disability are pervasive (such as customers' judgments
187. Feldman et al., supranote 172, at 237-38 & n.184.
188. See id.at 238.
189. See Anderson, supra note 161, at 1044 (providing an alternative reading of perceived
impairment).
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linking the value of retail products to salesclerks' ability to embody a
"normal" or even "perfect" appearance). That blurry, and ultimately
incoherent, line between "formal" bans on discrimination and
substantive accommodation creates some risk that courts may treat
challenges to such overtly prejudicial status-based policies as
requests for affirmative accommodation outside the bounds of the
amended law's "regarded as" prong.' 90 To clearly reach these
egregious examples of unequal treatment-based purely on status
regardless of physiological function-we need to move equality
beyond the division between "real" biological difference and
contingent social overlay.
IV. MAKING SUBSTANTIVE SOCIAL CHANGE NORMATIVE
The medical model of disability powerfully impedes efforts to
challenge pervasive substantive injustice by ascribing functional
disadvantages primarily to real and relevant individual deficient
status. Yet as Plessy demonstrated in the context of race, the move to
a social constructivist model can reinforce that barrier by making
status-based harm seem insubstantial-a contingent choice or
subjective attitude. 91'Unless disadvantaged individuals face perfectly
determinate biological constraints, placing the burden of change on
the disadvantaged individual will tend to seem substantively easier
and less costly than changing the external social environment (except
when the social harm is also highly individualized in the form of
isolated intentional bad actions).
Adam Samaha argues that the shift from a medical to a social
model of disability's causes does not, in itself, justify a shift in the
public policy response to disability.192 He argues that stronger legal
protections require further analysis of moral principles explaining
why socially caused harm to people with disabilities should lead to
societal duties to correct that harm.193 This Article suggests a more
fundamental intellectual problem with the focus on disability's
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Bagenstos, supra note 46.
See Bagenstos, supranote 46, at 452-54.
See Samaha, supranote 3, at 1253.
Id. at 1284-85.
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causation. Equality is hindered not so much by the lack of principled
support for social change. The greater barrier is the prevailing
assumption that the question of changing the status quo does not
deserve serious intellectual or legal scrutiny. For disability and other
disadvantaged identities, rigorous inquiry into the merits of
substantive social change tends to be undermined by stereotypes,
animus, indifference, or self-interest on the part of those who benefit
from the status quo. The questions and presumptions that frame the
moral debate about social change are as important as the moral
principles applied within the debate.
The social model of disability provides a vital step in opening the
door to more serious analysis of social change by helping us imagine
that perhaps things couldbe substantively different, and dramatically
so. The harms of the status quo might be neither fully determined by
individual nature nor a fully random and neutral fact of life
undeserving of our attention, debate, and action. 194 Nonetheless, the
social model can block consideration of social change when
presented as a supplement to a biological model within an
overarching framework designed to sort "real" from "contingent"
status. In the context of disability, that division between social
functioning and biological status has helped foreclose a rigorous
substantive debate about "who should change" by leading us into a
rationally dubious debate about "who is really disabled."
If we start instead with the presumption that individual biological
and social identity and functioning are thoroughly entangled and
inseparable, we might better evaluate the merits of social change in
the context of disability and beyond. Formal equality should prohibit
not just differentiation based on socially irrelevant biological
appearances but also differentiation that is highly relevant to
illegitimate substantive social goals, such as the bare desire to
harm. 195 By collapsing wrongful discrimination into the problem of
patently purposeless attention to biological form, the conventional
194. See Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641, 657 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)

(explaining the value of critical theory in general as imagining that things could be better).
195. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 848-70 (explaining that prohibitions on "rational"
discrimination are central to antidiscrimination law).
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formal equality scale narrows our view of antidiscrimination to
blindness toward individual identity, blocking our attention to
structural change.
When we reorient the antidiscrimination principle away from a
fundamental separation between biological status and social
functioning, disability is not so clearly relegated to the bottom of the
formal equality scale. If the question is not which physical
differences are socially irrelevant, but which socially interpreted
physical differences are relevant to legitimate substantive social
functions, then the "real" functional differences of disability can be
just as susceptible to prejudicial differentiation as the illusory
functional differences of racial identity. A stairs-only entrance to a
recently renovated courthouse could be as much a problem of formal
unequal treatment as a whites-only sign on that same entrance. For
example, that design could be due to the illegitimate assumption that
wheelchair users are not normal courthouse users, or to the biased
assumption that facilitating wheelchair users' normal, visible
entrance would threaten a traditional appearance of dignity and order.
Further, rejecting the biological versus social division would help
undermine the presumption that protected disability status should be
presumptively and naturally limited to those with real or perceived
impairments. If biological and social status are intertwined, then a
direct social identity as disabled-just like a socially imposed
identity as nonwhite-can be the object of illegitimate differentiation
even when the substantive biological content of that identity is
unarticulated or ambiguous.
Finally, an integrated social and biological view of
antidiscrimination could help bolster the formal equality scale itself,
not just raise disability's position on that scale. As Robert Hayman
and Nancy Levit have astutely analyzed, the assumption of a
biological essence separable from social functioning limits the theory
and doctrine of race discrimination.1 96 Although the conventional
equality framework presumes that racial differentiation reflects
suspect social construction, it positions this social construction as an
196. Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Un-Natural Things: Constructions of Race,
Gender, and Disability,in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY

159, 177-81 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
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overlay on a "real" physical essence. This biological/social division
helps narrow formal racial equality to colorblindness by making it
seem that the harm of racism disappears once we turn our gaze from
irrelevant physical differences like "color" toward relevant social
functioning. If we instead position "real" racial identity as social as
well as biological, then it is easier to see that the "race"
classifications deserving scrutiny for prejudice should be expanded to
include facially neutral functional criteria with racially disparate
impact. 197 This is not because racially disparate functioning has any
biological basis. Rather, if race is understood as a social category tied
to but not solely determined by physiological features, problematic
racial discrimination can operate through ideas about social
functioning that do not explicitly or consistently reference particular
biological features.
Substantive equality can also be strengthened by rejecting the
biological/social frame. In the conventional view, substantive
disadvantage tends to collapse into constraints on individual agency.
The medical model emphasizes biological limits, while the social
model emphasizes the social limits preventing individuals from
succeeding despite biological limitations. This means both sides tend
to skew the debate toward the question of individuals' limits rather
than toward the question of the merits of social change. Both sides of
this divide risk reinforcing the premise that individual physiological
weaknesses are abnormal individual failures, and that individuals
who cannot overcome those failures are abnormally dependent on
social or legal assistance. Moreover, both sides of the divide focus on
excusing individuals of responsibility for their disadvantages in order
to defend shifting to others the burden of alleviating those
disadvantages (through compensation or accommodation). By doing
so, both approaches risk reinforcing the presumption that social
change alleviating those disadvantages will be burdensome rather
than beneficial.
Martha Fineman's theory of substantive equality as support for
widely shared vulnerability provides an alternative to both sides of
197. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 299
(1971) (explaining that protection against facially neutral criteria with disparate racial impact
reflects the fact that such criteria are often the functional equivalent of race).
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this divide. 198 Following her model, we need not sort biological from
social harm or essential from contingent incapacity in order to justify
social support for alleviating the harm of vulnerability.1 99 Instead,
Fineman suggests a vision where the question of who should change
begins from the assumption that vulnerable persons are normal and
valued members of society. 200 Fineman analyzes the ideal of
individual autonomy as a myth used to penalize societal support for
some people's limitations and needs while privileging support for
others. 20 ' By replacing this myth with the premise of human
vulnerability, we can better recognize affirmative public support for
physical and social disadvantage as pervasive and fundamental to
overall societal well-being, not an exceptional response to those
whose incapacity is essentially biological or essentially social.20 2
Applying this vulnerability theory to disability rights, Ani Satz
explains how a civil rights analysis of disability blends into questions
of social welfare policy. 20 3 Consistent with that view, this Article's
comparison between workers' compensation and the ADA shows
how neither equality rights nor social welfare goals will provide
strong support for substantive social change without challenging the
premises underlying both.
The focus of substantive support must shift away from defining
social change as costly "redistribution" or "accommodation" and then
limiting those costs by narrowing the definition of "real"
vulnerability. Instead, meaningful equality and social justice requires
more careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of substantive
support for those whose identities as "different" or "impaired" have
198. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
199. See id at 8-9 (discussing vulnerability as a recognition of socially mediated universal
embodiment focusing on shared potential for dependency rather than distinguishing dependent
from independent persons).
200. Seeid.at 10-15.
201. Id. at 19; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 49-52 (2004).

202. See id. at 20-22 (advocating an approach to equality premised on the state obligation
to respond to vulnerabilities with equal regard and provide individuals meaningful opportunities
to develop their assets in the face of inevitable human vulnerability).
203. Satz explores an approach blending social welfare and antidiscrimination. Ani B. Satz,
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 550-66
(2008).
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elicited systematic social prejudice and exclusion. The presumption
that modifying buses to provide wheelchair access involves
"abnormal" substantive costs depends on an unexamined baseline
decision that fails to count the costs of first deciding to build an
inaccessible bus or the costs of providing seats compared to
wheelchair securement devices.2° Similarly, compensating injured
workers for actual work loss may seem less costly than compensating
"impairment" if we consider that higher compensation could increase
incentives for increasing long-term savings through greater safety or
workplace accommodations for injured workers. Elizabeth Emens
shows how prevailing approaches to the ADA fail to sufficiently
consider how reasonable accommodations often bring a range of
substantial social benefits to others.2 °5 These benefits go beyond the
particular person defined as disabled to include, for instance,
improved working conditions for presumably nondisabled or
differently disabled coworkers, enhanced productivity to employers
from reduced job turnover or from technological innovation, and
reduced irrational social stigma and stereotyping of disability. 0 6 The
idea of universal design goes further than the concept of
"accommodation" to shift the focus to how the social environment
can be constructed to better respond to a broad range of particular
human capacities and incapacities, for the benefit of all. 20 7
Neither the ADA's shift to civil rights nor a return to social
welfare will open the question of substantive social change to serious
normative debate without moving beyond a biological/social inquiry.
For both equality and social welfare policy, the analysis should move
away from scrutinizing individuals for failure, whether biological or
social, or whether identified as low functioning or low status. Instead,
the emphasis should be on more seriously considering the benefits of
204. See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 868-69 (explaining that changing the time frame of
analysis reveals many of the apparently "real" costs of substantive change are instead the
product of biased attitudes); McCluskey, supra note 5, at 880 & n. 119 (noting a case where
calculations of cost were scrutinized for social bias and the court found that providing
wheelchair access to city buses was not more costly than constructing inaccessible buses).
205. Elizabeth F. Emens, IntegratingAccommodations, 156 U. PENN. L. REv. 839, 845-48
(2008).
206. See id at 846-58 (summarizing types of "second party" and "third party" benefits).
207. Satz, supra note 203, at 542.
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restructuring social institutions to better alleviate both physiological
and social disadvantages for more people.

